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I’ve been asked to speak briefly today about trust in public and political life, and the 
extent to which there has been a genuine decline in public trust over the last few 
years. To cut a long story short, I believe there has been something of a decline, 
although its properties may be a little different from those that some commentators 
have detected. I also believe that some of the remedies proposed for the decline are 
somewhat misconceived. In that context, let me begin by welcoming today’s report, 
which, as well as being a solid piece of work and a good read, brings together many 
aspects of the issue which are often neglected in debate. 
 
I understand that Canada has been having a debate or two about trust of late. I 
certainly don’t want to comment on that directly. But if I may talk about my 
experiences in Europe over the last month, we see trust being central to a number of 
set-piece public consultations. 
 
Sometimes the purported lack of trust is very generalised. In the last week, France and 
Holland each held referendums about whether they should ratify the proposed EU 
Constitution. In advance, it had been thought that each country would vote ‘yes’, 
because of the overwhelming support for the constitution across the political elites of 
each country. President Chirac even advanced the date of the French referendum to 
increase the pressure for a ‘yes’ vote in other countries. However, in each country, the 
campaign rapidly focused on the supposed deficiencies, not of the constitution, but of 
the political classes who had recommended it. And ultimately, as we saw, the voters 
voted ‘no’. 
 
This tells me that, at some level, there is certainly a lack of trust, in that the voters, 
given an opportunity to humiliate their leaders of all parties, took it with both hands. 
In neither country could it be said there had been no warning. The French Presidential 
election of 2002 saw the surprise elimination of socialist Lionel Jospin in the first 
round of voting, leading to the anti-establishment hard right winger Jean Marie Le 
Pen standing against Chirac in the run off. In Holland, the maverick anti-immigration 
politician Pim Fortuyn would have been a major force following the 2002 election, 
had he not been assassinated. 
 
Lack of trust can also be very specific. In the UK, debate in the recent general election 
focused on whether Tony Blair could be trusted, following allegations that intelligence reports were read selectively in the run up to the Iraq war, in order to 
create a false impression that Saddam Hussein was more of a threat than he actually 
was. 
 
Again, the lack of trust is real. Opinion polls have regularly fingered Mr Blair as the 
least trusted of the major politicians in Britain. On the other hand, the message is 
somewhat equivocal – after all, who won? 
 
And we should expect equivocal messages. Trust – particularly public trust – is a 
simple-sounding word for a complex construct. One very welcome aspect of this 
report is its mature understanding of that complexity. Another is the emphasis it 
brings, not only on trust, but on trustworthiness. 
 
The dual nature of trust, that not only do you have to trust me, but that I have to be 
trustworthy, is often neglected in the urge to improve, restore or foster trust. 
 
We saw examples of that neglect in the UK election campaign. Mr Blair’s strategy to 
increase trust was a mortification strategy. He would appear before very hostile 
audiences, who would be incredibly rude to him as he defended his position over Iraq 
and some other unpopular policies that he has been accused of driving through. With 
such ceremonies, we were intended to see his punishment and purging. 
 
For the Conservatives, leader Michael Howard had a different strategy. His explicit 
strategy to create trust, apart from contrasting himself with Mr Blair, was to release 
detailed timetables of what he would do once in office. So he would say that on 26
th 
September he would do x, y or z and that was a firm promise, and if the relevant 
minister couldn’t do it by 26
th September, he would be sacked. 
 
Neither man significantly improved his trust ratings. They, or their strategists, seemed 
to believe that there was a magic bullet for creating trust. If I can just send out the 
right signals, then you will trust me. 
 
There cannot be such a magic bullet, for the simple reason that if all I have to do is to 
send out the right signals to gain trust, then I have no incentive to be trustworthy. 
 
There are many tragic aspects to the human condition, and this is one of them. I have 
control over my trustworthiness, but I don’t benefit from it (at least in the short term). 
I benefit from your trusting me, over which I have no control. Conversely, you benefit 
from my being trustworthy, but all you control is your trust. 
 
The important thing is not building trust per se, but rather in strengthening the links 
between my trustworthiness, and your trust in me. On these matters, the report before 
us today is admirably perspicuous. 
 
To trust or not to trust. To be trustworthy or untrustworthy. The two parameters 
determine a 2x2 matrix. There are four possibilities. If I am trustworthy and you trust 
me, then all well and good; we can get on a cooperate productively. On the other 
hand, if I am untrustworthy and you don’t trust me, then that’s hardly a satisfactory 
situation, but at least no-one has risked or lost anything. 
 But what happens when there is a mismatch? The case where I am untrustworthy and 
you trust me is the one that gets the focus. You will lose the assets you risk. We have 
a case of fraud. 
 
But there is another option, which is that I am trustworthy, but you don’t trust me. 
No-one loses anything they already possess; you don’t risk any assets. But what we 
have here is an opportunity cost. And this is the real cost, I believe, in the decline in 
trust. I wrote a book on trust a year or two ago, and here is one of the more surprising 
statistics I uncovered. In the 4
th quarter of 2002, online fraud cost US retailers 160 
million dollars. But they lost a further 315 million mistakenly rejecting legitimate 
sales because of over-zealous security systems. The opportunity costs were about 
twice those of the costs of fraud. 
 
My worry, as trust declines, is that we are going to be avoiding fraud at a greater 
opportunity cost. But the evidence is equivocal. Let me close with an observation. 
 
There has been an extraordinary ideological shift over the last twenty or thirty years. 
Back then, there were three political positions, left, right and centre. On the left there 
was socialism, the belief in class solidarity. On the right there was an authoritarian 
conservatism, a belief in the legitimacy of the existing social structure. In the centre 
was a paternal, Gladstonian liberalism. Each of these ideologies specifically links the 
individual’s interests with those of the social structures around. 
 
Nowadays, the ideological scene is very different. We still have left, right and centre. 
But on the left we have postmodernism, the celebration of diversity and the debunking 
of grand narratives. On the right we have neo-liberalism, the belief that the free 
exchange of resources encapsulates the preferences and interests of the individual. In 
the centre, we have Rawlsian liberalism, the view that people should be free to pursue 
their own ideas of the good (as opposed to the Gladstonian version, where people 
should be free to pursue Gladstone’s idea of the good). 
 
We also have an ideological fragmentation, with many different views that do not fit 
the left-right-centre model. We have green theory, feminism and other types of 
identity politics, Christian fundamentalism, Islamism, Islamic neo-fundamentalism, 
and so on. All these ideologies have in common the privileging of the convictions, 
beliefs or preferences of the individual. 
 
This is a broad, worldwide shift, and there’s little point bemoaning it. Indeed, there 
have been many gains from it. But as far as the trust debate is concerned, one clear 
result of this fragmentation has been a reduction in trust across ideological, interest or 
social barriers. We are much less likely to take the wise advice of American poet 
Richard Wilbur: “Go talk with those who are rumored to be unlike you”. We have 
become increasingly cynical about the motives of those working politicians whose 
currency is compromise, and whose working life is devoted to the messy business of 
running a country of millions of people with diverse, and often opposed, interests. 
 
Politicians seem to want methods for instantly restoring trust. Voters seem to want 
politicians to be hyper-clean. Each is cynical about the other. Neither attitude is 
realistic. As this report emphasises, the main action that any of us individually should 
take is to try to be as trustworthy as possible. The main thing that our public institutions should do is to try to ensure that the intermediaries between trust and 
trustworthiness are sound. There are bound to be errors and mismatches; by definition 
trust is a risk. 
 
But actually, today’s democracies are relatively clean. Our cynicism is often 
overstated. Our societies could be more confident than they are, and less 
introspective. There are no quick fixes, but there is plenty of room for sober, careful, 
realistic discussion, and today’s report is very welcome in that light. 